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Estimated Space and Storage Requirements for the CI Specialist and the Research Branch, (Not to include desk safes which should be part of the desk of each Branch professional and secretary.)

CI Specialist

Office and furnishings  
Non-attributable telephone  
10 Four Drawer safes

CI Specialist Secretary

Separate space and furnishings  
Storage cabinet (supplies)  
Coat Rack  
2 Four Drawer safes

Research Branch

Branch Chief office and furnishings

1 Four Drawer safe  
1 Two Drawer safe  
1 work table

Vault or secure area circa 10' X 10'

1 copy machine  
Storage shelves

Branch open storage and work tables, etc.

3 book shelf cabinets (5 shelves each)  
1 supply cabinet  
1 work table for viewer and paper cutter  
2 coat racks

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Branch Professionals

- 4 work areas and furnishings
- 9 four drawer safes (5 for reinvestigation)
- 1 two drawer safe
- 1 classified card storage container for reinvestigation

Branch Secretarial

- 2 work areas and furnishings
- 1 case control/processing table area

All desk areas except the CI Specialist should be equipped with desk, desk safe, and side tables, (either typing or work).

All Branch desks should have a telephone (both red and black lines) with a centralized receiving control and buzzer systems. The CI Specialist and his secretary should be on a separate system.

The current total four drawer safe storage capacity (not including vault shelves, but including desk safes)=42.

The projected total four drawer safe storage capacity for the Research Branch (not including vault shelves, but including desk safes)=24.  
(To include 6 from Reinvestigations).

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
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Current functions of FIOB/SRS which could be handled by other than the Research Branch:

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Function

Suggested Placement



CI Specialist and Chief,  
Clearance Division

Operations Support Branch

Staff and Operations Branch

Investigating and monitoring  
cases involving impersonation  
of CIA employees and assets

Staff and Operations Branch

Upon receipt of this type of information, an all traces search of the name, with variations, is initiated. When one of these individuals derives a benefit as a result of misrepresenting himself as employed by CIA, the Justice Department will consider prosecution which may result in considerable adverse publicity. The bulk of incoming information relating to impersonation does not warrant a memorandum, however, when there is a possibility that the person's activities will continue to attract the attention of other agencies or be publicized in the press, a summary is submitted so that an appropriate response can be made to

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inquiries from these agencies. The individuals who are prone to make a false claim of Agency employment are usually involved in other activities that are illicit or at least questionable. The two items of concern in handling impersonation cases are: A very intensive search of Indices should be made. This is not always a simple matter since the names are often spelled phonetically. In the event that DCS has not advised the requestor regarding the individual's Agency affiliation, it is obvious that we should be certain of the subject's status and not be forced to change our reply at a later date. It is also important that a prompt reply be made to the requestor, which is usually a law enforcement agency. Though DCS usually handles this, occasionally there are oversights and this can be a source of embarrassment. An average of three hours per week is involved in these matters.

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Current and Continuing Functions of SAOB/SRS which could be Handled by Other than the Research Branch

<u>Function</u>	<u>Suggested Placement</u>
Liaison with Counterintelligence Counterparts and others in other agencies, servicing other OS components request for investigative and polygraph data, etc. (NSA, ASA, NSGC, DIA, DIS, OSI, ACSI, NIS, AID, USIA, State, CSC, ONNI, etc.)	Staff and Operations Branch

Although this function is presently divided among three officers of this Staff, with the Deputy Chief, SRS, handling the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Chief, Liaison and External Operations Branch handling the Civil Service Commission, day-to-day liaison with the United States Information Agency, the Naval Investigative Service, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and SAOB handling the remainder, this Attachment will deal only with those liaison activities accomplished by SAOB but is written on the presumption that one full-time officer, through compression and with some lengthening of response time, can fulfill all the liaison tasks, less the FBI which will be assigned to the Chief, Clearance Division, if the suggestions of the D/S and DD/S are adopted by the sub-committee.

(1) National Security Agency--This is the highest demand liaison activity conducted by SAOB and accounts for about half of the man-day of the officer performing the liaison function. Requests to NSA generally exceed requests from NSA. Naturally, there is some brokering between NSA which involves other than routine activities between the two agencies, and this aspect proves quite time consuming, but the bulk of the product deals with the category known as "dual applicants," i.e., individuals who have applied for employment with both agencies or who previously worked for one and now are applying for the other.

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The foregoing only skims the major problems involved with NSA and does not deal with the regular, but less routine, requests from NSA which require an IP trace and coordination of release of the resultant information to NSA with the controlling DD/O component and any number of situations which result from such in-depth liaison. The liaison also entails exchange visits with NSA, a time-consuming "chore" because of the distance involved and the difference in working hours of the two agencies.

(2) Secondary in demand upon the liaison officer's time is liaison with the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Special Investigations, USAF. The liaison with ASA and NSGC is handled by Gray phone, and like NSA, frequently requires discussions of codeword information. The prime customer from this end is again the present Personnel Security Division, though not limited to it. Both ASA and NSGC maintain

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Liaison with DIA and OSI are enhanced in that they have "roving" liaison officers, badged for entry into the Headquarters Building because of other offices than OS with whom they also have liaison. The liaison, like the others, is a two-way street and involves cases of individual

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The liaison in both directions with ASA, NSGC, DIA and OSI account for some 25% of the liaison officer's time. In the case of ASA and NSGC the bulk of the requests flow from CIA to these agencies; in the case of DIA and OSI, it flows primarily in the opposite direction.

(3) The remainder of the liaison officer's time is consumed by requests, again in both directions, involving a variety of federal agencies, including the Department of State, Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Department of Commerce,

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[REDACTED]

In addition, normal name checking is conducted in both directions, the prime customer in this Agency being PSD. Recently, we established a working relationship with and have conducted name checks for the Defense Investigative Service. (It might be noted that the AID and USIA liaison is conducted on a most discreet basis through the Directors of Security of those agencies and with the Deputy Director of Security of the Department of Commerce [REDACTED], all long-time friends of the liaison officer. Similarly, the recently established liaison with DIS is through a long-time friend of the liaison officer. These liaison situations are particularly enhanced through these relationships and would initially be less productive in the hands of the successor liaison officer.) Liaison with the special activities unit of the Office of Security, Department of State, has continued for some twenty years of which about ten years have been by the present liaison officer and has been without compromise. Another recently established liaison effort

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has been with the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, Department of Justice, again initiated at both ends by long-time friends; name checks have been exchanged and the effort appears to be producing.

There are several other agencies such as Coast Guard Intelligence, Federal Aviation Agency, [REDACTED]

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STAFFING: The foregoing effort needs at least one full-time liaison officer and about half the work time of a secretary to perform.

STORAGE: Much of the return from these liaison activities is placed in the appropriate security files on which PSD and IOS have based the inquiries. On incoming inquiries, however, it has been necessary to maintain a separate file to provide a chronological reference file of what was asked, and more importantly, what we responded. Other than desk safes it would be expected that at least one four drawer safe and an area suitable for the storage of SI material (NSA, ASA, and NSGC) and Gray phone, is required.

COMMUNICATIONS: A Gray line is essential to the ASA, NSA, and NSGC liaison effort since all liaison exchanges

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[REDACTED]  
of the information.

OPERATIONAL FUNDS REQUIRED: None are expended in this effort.

OVERLAP TIME REQUIRED: To insert a new case officer, it would probably take only a minimal briefing and introductions to accomplish a pro forma liaison relationship, albeit not

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particularly productive from the standpoint of what information we need. It should, therefore, allow an overlap period of several months with the replacement "switch-hitting" on the liaison tasks, with guidance from the predecessor as to how different situations are handled for the protection of the liaison activity and the successor liaison officer. The successor liaison officer should have authority for certain freedom in latitude of response to expedite arrival at the point that "mutual blackmail" is developed and a free exchange can reoccur. For dealings with ASA, NSA, and NSGC, the successor should, of course, have approval to deal with SI and will have to gain sufficient familiarity with it to determine how much of it can be sterilized or adapted to be contained in a security file.

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FunctionSuggested Placement

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**SECRET**Current and Continuing Functions of LEOB/SRS which could be Handled by Other than the Research Branch:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Suggested Placement</u>
Liaison with Counterintelligence Counterparts and others in other Agencies.	Staff and Operations Branch

These requests originate from within SRS and other components of OS on items deemed to need special handling for reasons of sensitivity or need for expeditious treatment. As a two way street, requests are received from counterparts. Actions involves the passage of information orally and in writing. Contact is potentially with: ACSI; AID; OSI; BNND; CSC; Department of Commerce; State Department; IRS; Department of Labor; ONIS; Secret Service; and USIA. As practical matter, most contact recently has been with ACSI; CSC, ONI and USIA.

The time expended on this function varies but on the average, including processing and analysis of requests, probably entails 2-4 hours weekly.

The storage requirements, other than control files held in desk safe for convenience, would be minimal-records covering past actions and not yet destroyed.

The frequency of contact is spasmodic as need generates. The contacts are weekly or more often with USIA and CSC.

No operational funds are required.

The overlap time required for the inception of a new case officer would probably take a half-day briefing, etc. Some introductions of individuals would be required.

On a low priority, use Special Access Sources.

Operations Support Branch

Special access sources -  - both supply information (mail and oral) they deem of potential value to OS and to the Agency. They obtain the information through their sources and contacts. They will handle special requests levied against them.

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